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Abstract
It has long been recognized that unrestricted exploitation of fish populations inevitably leads to inefficiency.^
At best, the absence of controls brings about fishing effort levels that exceed those at which the marginal cost
of a fish equals its value to consumers. At worst, this allocative inefficiency is compounded by a technical
inefficiency: A given sustained yield is achieved with higher than necessary expenditures of effort. By suitably
restricting fishing activity through an appropriate system of catch taxes, a regulatory body could ensure
efficient exploitation of a fish population. The regulatory approaches actually used in practice, however,
include technological controls (restrictions on the size, power, and other cliaracteristics of boats; port
.turnaround time; or fishing gear) and.limitations on season length or total catch. Each of these regulatory
measures is flawed in that it introduces inefficiencies of its own.
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It has long been recognized that unrestricted exploitation of fish
populations inevitably leads to inefficiency.^ At best, the absence of controls
brings about fishing effort levels that exceed those at which the marginal cost
of a fish equals its value to consumers. At worst, this allocative inefficiency
is compounded by a technical inefficiency: A given sustained yield is achieved
with higher than necessary expenditures of effort. By suitably restricting
fishing activity through an appropriate system of catch taxes, a regulatory body
could ensure efficient exploitation of a fish population. The regulatory
approaches actually used in practice, however, include technological controls
(restrictions on the size, power, and other cliaracteristics of boats; port
.turnaround time; or fishing gear) and.limitations on season length or total
catch. Each of these regulatory measures is flawed in that it introduces
inefficiencies of its own.
The ultimate objective of this paper is to use catch, effort, and stock
data from the commercial Pacific halibut fishery to measure the degree of
technical inefficiency introduced as a. result of that particular fishery's
regulatory environment. We begin, however, with a discussion reviewing the
rationale for regulation of commercial fisheries and illustrating the sources of
inefficiency that can be introduced thereby.
Overexploitation of Fish Stocks and'Regulatory Measures'
For the purposes of 'this preliminary discussion it is useful to make
several simplifying assumptions. The first of these will also be maintained in
the empirical work to follow: The growth rate of a fish population depends only
on the population's aggregate biomass, not on the distributions of age or fish
size within the population. Second, we will ignore issues relating to limited
fishing seasons and assume instead that fishing effort is uniformly distributed
2throughout the year. Finally,- it is also useful to restrict attention to
comparisons of steady state equilibria; that is, situations in which the catch
rate equals the natural growth rate leaving the size of the population constant
through time.
Let S denote the biomass, or stock, of a fish population, and let g(S)^
represent the annual rate of growth of the stock net of natural mortality. The
graph of g(-) in Figure 1 illustrates the two opposing forces affecting growth
rates of unexploited fish populations. On the one hand, the greater the biomass,
the more fish there are to breed and grow. On the other hand, the greater the
biomass, the greater is the competition for food and possibly other environmental
amenities'. At low biomasses, the first of these forces dominates. The growth
rate increases, albeit at a diminishing rate, with increases in the fish stock'.
Beyond some critical stock level, howeyer, the second force comes to dominate and
the growth rate diminishes with stock.
Each of the ordinates of the function g(-) can be thought of as a
sustainable annual yield. For example, if the fish stock were Si to begin, and
sufficient fishing effort were expended to harvest Qq pounds of fish per year,
fishing mortality would just offset net natural growth leaving stock unchanged.
With equal expenditures of fishing effort in subsequent years, the annual yield
of Qq pounds could be sustained indefinitely.
It is clear from Figure-1 that any sustainable yield less than 'the
maximum, Qj^, could be achieved with either of two fish stocks. Qq.pounds per
year, for example, could be harvested on a sustainable basis from populations of
size S]_ or 52'. To see how these two alternatives would compare in cost terms,
we need add only one additional plausible assumption about fishing technologies:
Harvesting any given quantity of fish is less costly the larger is the stock.
3Thus Qq pounds per year could be harvested on a sustainable basis at an average
cost of say c^ dollars per pound from a population of size S]_. or at a lower
average cost of C2 dollars per pound from a population of size S2. The entire
sustainable yield/average cost relationship is plotted as the AC curve in Figure
2. It consists of efficient and inefficient branches which indicate per unit
costs corresponding to operation in, respectively, the larger and the smaller of
the two fish stocks consistent with any given sustainable yield. The MC curve
in Figure 2 is marginal to the efficient branch of the AC curve.
Suppose that the demand curve for fish is D;^ Figure 1. The efficient
output rate is while, in the absence of restrictions on exploitation,
equilibrium would be reached with output at point where average cost
equals market price. The-deadweight welfare loss associated with this allocative
inefficiency may or may not be worth correcting through any of a variety of
costly regulatory measures..
But it is situations like those associated with demand curve D2, not D]^,
that typically lead to regulatory action. Given demand curve D2, efficient
output is Q2 but the absence of regulation would result in equilibrium at po.int
E2 and output Q2®- Unrestricted exploitation leads not only to an inefficient
output, but also to actual costs of producing whatever level of output is settled
upon that are substantially greater than those which could be achieved.
Any of a variety of controls could be adopted to eliminate or reduce
these inefficiencies. At least conceptually, the ideal approach would be a tax
equal to the difference between the marginal and the average cost of fish at the
output rate where demand and marginal cost schedules intersect,^ There appears
to be no fishery, however, in which controls take the form of output taxes. ^
Rather, under the typical system, regulation involves allowing free access to any
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fishing vessel that abides by restrictions on such things as vessel type, crew
size, gear employed, length of season, area fished, and port turnaround time.
In specifying these restrictions, the most'common stated objective of regulatory
bodies is to maximize sustained yield from a fish population; that is, to set
annual output equal to in Figure 2.
With demand schedule D2, equilibrium at an annual output of Qj^ requires
fisherman to perceive their average costs to be C4 dollars per pound. One way
•to achieve this is with technological controls in the form of vessel type- or
fishing gear restrictions that increase the resource costs of catching fish by
(c^ - C3) dollars per pound. The real world equivalent of c^ - C3 can be
enormous. One,'perhaps extreme, example is particularly suggestive. Along the
Virginia shore of Chesapeake Bay, oysters can be taken only with hand-operated
tongs, not with considerably more efficient dredges. In Maryland, dredges may
be used, but only when pulled by sailboats except on Mondays and Tuesdays when
sailboats may be aided by motorized pusher boats [Alexander, p. 244].
An alternative common strategy for limiting overexploitatioh involves the
use of a non-allocated catch quota; that is, a regulation terminating the fishing
"season when the fleet's cumulative landings reach a predetermined limit. Such"
a regulation creates a tendency for fishing effort to be expended at very high
rates as each crew scrambles to claim as large a share of the fishery's quota as
possible, and can lead to significant curtailments of season lengths. In the
Pacific halibut fishery, for example, the use of non-allocated catch quotas led
to the reduction of season lengths from the nine months common during the 1920s
to less than one month in the 1950s.
I s
Like technological controls, non-allocated catch quotas introduce
I
inefficiencies of their own. First, if capital equipment is specialized to the
5particular type of fishing, confining fishing activity to an artificially
abbreviated season increases the capital stock needed to support any given annual
total effort and reduces the capital stock utilization rate. Second, the short,
frantic seasons induced by non-allocated quotas are likely to be characterized
by lower catches per unit effort than could be realized with longer, more
leisurely seasons. This is due to diminishing returns to fishing effort: For
a given fish population, the rate at which fish are caught increases but likely
at a decreasing rate with respect to the rate at which effprt is. expended.*^
The objective of the empirical work in this paper is the assessment of
the waste resulting from the second source of inefficiency identified above, the
combination of artificially shortened seasons and diminishing returns to fishing
effort. Our application involves the Pacific halibut fishery, one in which a
non-allocated catch quota is the primary regulatory instrument and "fishing
frenzies" are an institution. The problem of measuring the resulting
inefficiency is complicated by the fact that extending the season in any one year
will affect not only catch in that year but also the year-ending stock and,
therefore, the potential for catching fish in subsequent years. Thus the
assessment: must take into account the effects of season lengthening over, a series
of years and must be based on a model incorporating both the technology whereby
fishing effort interacts with stock to catch fish and the growth law that
describes the natural evolution of stock levels over time. The next section
establishes the theoretical relationships among catch, effort, stock, and season
length that form the building blocks of such a model. From them, with biological
and institutional features of the halibut fishery as a guide, a statistical model
is assembled. Finally, the statistical model is estimated and the results used
6as a basis for judging the magnitude of this one particular variety of
inefficiency in regulated commercial fisheries.
Theoretical Relations Among Stock. Catch. Effort, and Season Length
Let S(r) denote the weight of the "adult biomass" of a fish population
at time r, where r is a continuous variable. By the "adult biomass," we mean the
portion of the population that is vulnerable to the fishery; that is, the portion
above a statutory size minimum or sufficiently large to bite hooks or become
entangled in nets. Even if there were no fishing, the adult biomass would vary
over time as the result of two distinct phenomena: growth and natural mortality
of existing adults, and additions of new adults due to the recruitment of
adolescents.
The first of these phenomena is modelled as a continuous proces's. Let
the instantaneous rate of growth of adults net of natural mortality, S(r), be
given by
S (r) - ^ - GS(r)(M - S(r)) (1)
where G> 0 and M> 0 are parameters characterizing the population growth law.^
This function possesses the qualitative features of g(*) graphed in Figure 1
although now ordinates of the function are interpreted as instantaneous growth
V
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rates of the adult biomass.
Recruitment, the second phenomenon affecting the size of an unexploited
population, is modelled as a discrete process. In other words, we assume that
all maturing adolescents in a given year enter the adult biomass at the same
moment. For integer values .of t, define R^ as the biomass of adolescents
I
maturing during year t. It is natural to expect that R^. will be related to the
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size of the cohort's parent stock and a widely adopted functional form for this
relationship is
a,
R = (2a)
where a]_ > 0 and a2 > 0 are parameters, n is the (integer) number of years
required for fish to mature, and S.(. is an "average" stock for year t.
therefore, is the biomass of the parent stock of year t recruits.^
The popularity of this form is due to the fact that appropriate parameter
values generate functions, like the one graphed in Figure 3, for which
recruitment is nearly constant over broad ranges of values for This is a
common feature of fish populations. Since each female lays thousands of eggs and
only a tiny proportion of them develop into adult fish, recruitment primarily
depends, not on the size of the parent generation, but on the ability of the
ecosystem to support life in the embryonic, larval, and juvenile stages. Indeed
it may well be appropriate to drop as an argument altogether and replace
(2a) with
\ = h(Z^: 7) • (2b)
where is a vector reflecting environmental conditions in years t, t-1,
t-2, , . . , and t-n, and 7 is a vector of parameters.
Now imagine that fishing effort is devoted to catching a portion of the
adult biomass. Let C(r) denote the instantaneous rate at which fish are
caught at time r and assume
C(r) = q S(r)(E(7-))'' ' (3)
where E(r) is the rate at which fishing effort is expended at time r (measured,
for example, in units of "boat-days per day" or, simply, "boats") and q > 0 and
0 < Id < 1 are parameters. This particular" form of the "fishing production
function" incorporates the following plausible features. For a constant effort
/
rate, the catch rate increases with the stock. For a constant stock, the catch
rate increases with effort, possibly.at a diminishing rate.^
The fishery's annual fishing seasons alternate with off-season periods.
For simplicity, we imagine the fishery's activities as occurring over a sequence
of "years," each incorporating a consecutive season and off-season and beginning
• fion a season opening day. We assume that a given year's recruits enter the adult
biomass as a discrete injection occurring at the beginning of the year. The
evolution of the stock over the balance of the year is determined by equations
(1) and (3). Given fishing effort rate E(t), the population's rate of growth net
of natural and fishing mortality is given by
S(r) - GS(r)(M - S(r)) - q S(T)(E(r))'' (4)
Limit attention to a time interval, say [r^, + At], on which E(r) = E, a
constant, and define constants f = q E^ and H= GM- f. Then (4) can be
rewritten as
S(r) = S(r)(H - G S(r))
or
[S(t)(H - GS(7)]'^ S(r) =1 (5)
Integrating both sides of (5) with respect to r, from to + Wr, and
solving for S(r^ + Ar) yields^
H S(r )
S(r. + Ar)
A GS(t^)(1 - exp(-H At)) + HexpC-H Ar) .
Equation (6) can be used to relate stock at the end of a season," or off
season, to stock at the beginning. Let S^lc ^2^ denote the adult biomasses
9at the beginning and end, respectively, of the season in year t. The
interpretations of these and subsequently defined variables are illustrated in
Figure.4's sketch of a representative stock profile. Let denote the length
of year t's season and let denote the (constant), rate at which fishing effort
is expended,during the season. Then if (6) is evaluated
with and + Ar interpreted as the beginning and ending season dates, the
result is
" —2t G S^^d - eKp(-HJ^^)).+
where ^ G M - q Now let 83'^ denote Stock at the end of the off-season
in year t and let T2t denote the off-season's length. - Then with (r^ , + Ar)
interpreted as the off-season (an interval in which E = 0 and H .= G M) , (6)
yields'
G M
(8)3t G 82^(1 - exp(-G MT^^)) + GMexp(-G MT^^)
Equations (7) and (8) describe the evolution of stock from the beginning
of a fishing season to the end of the subsequent off-season. To complete the
description for a full annual cycle, recruitment is added to the off-season
ending stock:
- <9)
Finally, total catch in year t, C^, can be obtained, by integrating the
catch rate over the season:
T
C = f S(r- + Ar)dAr
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where a q and, again, is interpreted as the opening date of the
season in year t. Substituting for S(r^ + Ar) from equation (6) with H =
and integrating yields^^
= (f^/G) ln(l + S^^(exp(Hj.T^^) - 1)) (10)
Solving for yields
H G C
•Tit "
A Statistical Model for Pacific Halibut
Imagine that one had a set of provisional values for the parameters
embedded in equations (7) through (11). Then, if given information on fishing
effort, season and off-season lengths, the variables influencing annual
recruitment, and an initial stock level, equations (7), (8), and (9) could be
used to project a series of season opening stock levels. Given these estimates
of season opening stocks and, again, information on fishing efforts and season
lengths (catches), equation (10) (equation (11)) could be used to project the
corresponding annual catches (season lengths). Intuitively it is clear, then,
that equations (7) through (11) provide a.basis for estimating the system's
unknown parameters: Choose estimates for which projected stocks and catches
(season lengths) "match" actual figures as closely as possible.
Specifying the details of this estimation strategy requires more careful
consideration of the institutional aspects of the Pacific halibut fishery. The
fishery is divided into geographically delineated statistical areas. A given
year's catch in a given area is determined, albeit subject to error, by a non-
allocated catch quota imposed before the season opens.The stock of boats
11
available at the beginning of the season determines a maximum rate at which
fishing effort can be expended.Effort is perfectly inelastically supplied at
this maximum rate throughout the season.The length of the season in a given
area is determined as the time-required for the fleet to land the area's quota.
It seems appropriate, therefore, to treat the current season's catch and effort
rate, along with lagged values of these and other variables, as predetermined,
and to view current stock and season length as jointly determined endogenous
variables.
The available estimates of adult biomasses for each statistical area of
the Pacific halibut fishery are best interpreted, not as beginning or ending
season stocks, but as stock levels at season midpoints. The midseason biomass
in year t, S^, can be related to both the beginning and ending season stocks
using equation (6): .
"t-Slf.
and
H S
^ ^ (13)2t G S^(l - exp(-H^T^^/2)) + H^exp(-H^T^^/2)
Initial estimation experiments using the recruitment function (2a) were
unsuccessful: The quality of fit continued to improve as a^^ and-a2 increased
without bound in fixed proportion. This implies that R^, in fact, is independent
^t-n suggests abandoning (2a) for C2b) . Perhaps the single most important
"environmental" determinant of recruitment is the rate of mortality due to the
incidental catch of halibut by other fisheries.Since incidentally caught
halibut tend to be below legal size, their deaths affect recruitment in
subsequent years rather than the size of the current adult population. Accurate
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figures for by-catch mortality are unavailable but it is widely believed that its
effects were minor before 1960 and progressively more significant thereafter.
Thus we model recruitment as being constant through 1959 and changing (presumably
decreasing) in a linear trend from 1960 onward:
fort<tQ ^2b,)
max 0
where tQ corresponds to 1959, to the last year of the sample, and
. ^2 ^tmax-
Starting with equations (11) and (12), use equatipn (9) with given by
equation (2b') to substitute for in terms of equation (8) to
substitute for in terms of a.nd equation (13) to substitute for .S2t-.i
in terms of The result is a pair of simultaneous equations determining
period t values for endogenous variables T]_ and S in terms of predetermined
observable variables; In symbolic terms
Tit -
where = (G, M, q, b, A]_, A2) is the vector of parameters of the population
. growth relationship, the fishing production function, and the recruitment
function; and X^. = (E^, C^, t, T^^._-]^, T2t-i» ^t-l' ^t-l^ ^ vector of variables
r
predetermined as of the beginning of year t.
Data. Estimation, and Simulation Results
Annual catch, effort, and season length data for each of the fishery's
statistical areas have been recorded since the late 1920s when- the International
Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) was formed.IPHC estimates of adult
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bioraasses are less complete. Consequently, this application will be limited to
Statistical. Area 2 and to a time period beginning in 1935. We end the sample at
1972 since, in 1973, the IPHC increased the legal minimum size of halibut and so
effectively redefined this study's concept of the adult stock.Statistical
Area 2 consists of the waters off a 1250 mile stretch of North American Pacific
coastline from northern California to Cape Spencer, Alaska. In 1972, the last
year of the sample, Area 2 accounted for 38% of the fishery's catch. Definitions
and dimensions for the model's variables and the actual^ time series used in
estimation are given in the Appendix.
Rearranging (14) and (15) and augmenting them with additive disturbance
terms yields
Tit - ^l(6';X^) - ei^ (16)
St - - ®2t
We assume that
®2t = "2^2^-1 ^ "2t
where u^^. and U2t ^.re serially uncorrelated and jointly normally distributed.
Quasi-first-differencing of (16) and (17) yields
$l(^;Tit.X^.X^_l) - , (18).
$2 ^^'®t''^lt'\'\-l ^ ^ ''2t (19)
where , ^2).
$l(Il;Tit,Xt,Xt.i) = T^t - ^i(K';Xt) -
i4
and
^ - "2(^1 - ^2^^'•\t-r\-l^^
The parameter vector in equations (18) and (19) was estimated by full
information maximum likelihood (FIML) for the time period 1937 - 1972.^^ Results
are reported in Table 1. The R^s are squared simple correlation coefficients
between the series of optimal one-step-ahead forecasts of season length and
stock, and the corresponding actual series. The parameter estimates are valued
primarily for their use in the dynamic simulation experiments; few of them are
interpretable on an individual basis. Point estimates of hi and A2 do suggest
that, as expected, recruitment decreased after 1960, although this finding is. not
statistically significant. One result foreshadows the implications of the
simulation exercises:- The estimate of b is only slightly less .than one and is
not significantly different from one at conventional levels.
Our main objective in estimating the model was to obtain parameter values
that can be used as a basis for simulation experiments. A program of lengthening
the seasons over which fishing efforts are expended has the potential for
increasing the catch per unit effort over the long run. To measure this effect,
simulations of catches and stocks were undertaken for the actual series of total
efforts and for actual and hypothetical series of season and off-season lengths.
Prior to 1924, the halibut fishery operated year around. Fishing
conditions were hazardous during the winter, however, and winter-caught halibut
tended to be of low quality. These considerations led to treaty negotiations
which resulted in closure of the fishery for three months a year "beginning in
1924. Accepting this sort of closure as consistent with efficient exploitation
of the halibut population, the hypothetical season length was set equal to 0.75
X 365.25 = 273.9375 days.
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With our estimate of midseason biomass in 1937, we used equation (12) to
estimate the opening season biomass in 1937. Equation (10) was•then used to
simulate catch in both the actual and hypothetical 1937 seasons. Equations (7),
(8), and (9) were used next to simulate the opening season stock for 1938 for
each of the cases. By iterating this process, entire series of simulated catches
for 1937 - 1972 for both actual and hypothetical season lengths were generated.
Actual fishing seasons were relatively short (less than 100 days) for
each of the 20 years from 1941 through 1960. Had actual total efforts been
applied uniformly over 9 month seasons during this interval, effort rates would
have been lower than actual ones by an.average of 82%. Yet even for this period,
the simulated catches for the hypothetical seasons averaged only 2.2% higher than
those for the actual seasons.The potential gains from applying fishing effort
a.t more leisurely rates appear to be small.
Notice that the sample period used for estimation provides a reasonable
basis for making the projection described in the previous paragraphs. The
hypothetical effort rates during the 1941 - 1960 seasons range from 820 to 1,410
skate-soaks per day (See the data appendix). Thus the projection is for effort
rates that are more-or-less within the sample since the range of actual rates for
the -estimation period is from a low of 1,140 to a high of 9,810 skate-soaks per
day. Over this range, no significant tendency toward diminishing returns to
effort was detected. Again, the estimate of b was not significantly less than
1. It is possible, of course, that the onset of diminishing returns does not
occur until even higher effort rates. With this in mind, it is interesting to
note that Area 2 fishing effort rates in recent years (1984 and 1985, for
example) were in the neighborhood of 20,000 skate-soaks per day. At these
levels, the benefits of season lengthening may yet be important.
16
Data Appendix
The gear used in catching halibut are called "skates," long lines with
baited hooks attached at intervals. The method involves deploying a skate,
leaving it in the sea for several hours, then retrieving it. This activity,
undertaken for a single skate, is called a "skate-soak," the basic unit for
measuring physical effort input in commercial halibut fishing.
The following data are for Statistical Area 2. Catch, effort, and season
length data 'were obtained from various Annual Reports of the IPHC. Stock
estimates are from Deriso and Quinn (1983).
C:
^2
S:
E:
(catch) 1,000,000 lbs.'
(season length) days
(interval, between this season and the following season) days
(adult biomass) 1,000,000 lbs.
(total effort) 1.000 skate-soaks
(effort rate = E /T^) 1,000 skate-soaks per day
YEAR C E* Tl T2 S
1935 23.559 379.6 159 191 116.8
1936 23.319 424.8 148 217 118.4
1937 24.073 389.5 135 246 120.6
1938 24.109 341.0 120 245 121.6
1939 25.590 412.0 . 120 246 121.1
1940 26.403 425.9 104 261 118.4
1941 24.290 386.6 91 289 114.7
1942 23.434 356.1 75 290 113.2
1943 25,361 349.2 , 66 334 116.0
1944 26.349 • 301.6 51 295 129.5
1945 23.796 296.4 46 319 151.7
1946 29.168 346.2 42 323 168.9
1947 27.739 319.5 39 327 177.7
1948 27.827 3il.9 32 333 183.8
1949 26.412 308.8 34 331 189.9
1950 26.997 306.3 32 333 196.9
1951 30.598 347.1 36 343' 203.0
1952 30.808 320.6 34 334 205.3
1953 32.711 252.4 32 332 204.4
1954 36.791 264.8 27 334 199.3
1955 27.806 225.6 31 343 187.3
1956 35.097 263.9 45 301 173.5
1957 30.534 300.5 54 314 165.8
1958 30.210 294.5 66 296 165.3
1959 30.530 307.2 75 291 167.8
1960 31,758 300.5 98 276 169.8
(continued)
YEAR C ' E* •1
1961 28.860 298.8 120 244 169.7
1962 28.718 337.1 122 243 166.3
1963 26.170 334.9 205 153 157.9
1964 19.569 258.2 137 228 146.9
1965 24.252 278.7 137 236 138.2
1966 23.259 279.7 108 257 133.0
1967 19.719 240.3 159 202 128.4
1968 16.394 187.5 164 204 122.9
1969 22.377 272.5 137 216 117.2
1970 19.885 266.8 149 228 112.6
1971 16,773 218.6 178 182 110.8
1972 16.283 232.5 101 273 110.7
17
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Notes
^Gordon (1954) appears to have provided the seminal piece in what is now
a sizable literature on the economics of commercial fisheries. Since our paper
is concerned with a rather specific aspect that is somewhat out of the main
stream of discussion, it would not benefit significantly from the context
provided by a comprehensive literature review. Such a review is given by
Schellberg (1988).
as assumed here, the growth rate of a fish population depends only
on its biomass, the appropriate tax per pound would be independent of the size
of fish caught. If the population's growth rate depends on its age distribution
as well as its biomass, the appropriate tax per pound would vary inversely with
age of fish.
^The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 empowers the
National Marine Fisheries Service to impose fees on foreign fishing vessels
wishing to fish in the "US Fishery Conservation Zone." The fees established for
1977 included a charge equal to 3.5 percent of the estimated dockside value in
1975 of species which foreign vessels were allowed to catch. The announced
criteria leading to imposition of these fees included, however,
"1. Fees will not be used as a management tool to restrict foreign fishing.
Foreign fishing effort will be controlled by management plans [i.e. quotasj."
[Federal Register. 42, p. 8176]
'^ Suppose, for example, that different areas of the fishing grounds were
characterized by different productivities. Then with say 10 boats fishing on
each of 100 days, each vessel could operate in the most productive areas every
day. On the other hand, with 100 boats fishing on each of 10 days, congestion
might force some boats to operate in marginally less productive areas each day.
1000 boat-days of total effort would catch more fish in the first case than in
the second.
^This is the form of the growth function used in the Schaefer (1958)
model of the dynamics of exploited fish populations. Schnute (1977) discusses
estimation of the Schaefer production model using catch and effort data.
Schnute's procedures do not make use of stock estimates nor do they address the
simultaneous determination of catch and season length.
^This is the Beverton-Holt recruitment function. For a discussion, see
Clark (1976). Equation (2a) embodies the implicit assumption that the "adult
population," defined as the set of fish vulnerable to the fishery, is precisely
the same as th6 set of sexually mature fish. This seems to be approximately true
for Pacific halibut. The set of "adults," by either definition, consists of fish
aged eight years or older.
^With b - 1, equation (3) describes what is commonly termed a "mass-
contact-rate" technology reflecting the seeming similarity between fishing and
chemical processes in which two different types of molecules react at rates
proportional to the product of their concentrations. It would be appealing to
19
allow the possibility of diminishing returns to stock as well. Replacing (3)
with ^
d(T) = q(S(r))^(E(r))l' (3')
for 0 < a < 1 would accomplish this. The problem with this specification is a
practical one: Integrals of the corresponding version of equation (5) would have
no closed form expression.
0
°Thus these "years" needn't start on January 1 nor be 365 days in Length.
^Equation (6) is correct for H^ 0. If H= 0 the definite integral of
(5) equals the limit, as H approaches 0, of the expression on the right-hand-side
of (6). Thus equation (6) covers both cases when appropriately interpreted.
l^Fbr the H " 0 case, the right-hand-side of (10) is replaced by its
limit as H approaches 0.
^^Regulators monitor landings and try to anticipate the day on which the
quota will be reached. This anticipated date is fixed as the season closing date
two or three days in advance. As a result, actual catches differ from
predetermined quotas, normally by small amounts. In addition to the quota, a
maximum season length is announced at the start of the season. In the
statistical area examined in our empirical work, the quota was the binding
constraint in 31 of the 36 years in the sample.
19•'-'^ For a time, the maximum fishing effort rate was also influenced by port
turnaround time limitations that resulted from a voluntary agreement among boat
operators aimed at lengthening the seasons. This agreement broke down with
increased entry during the 1970s by boats not "licensed" by the International
Pacific Halibut Commission.
1 Q ,
•'•-'This assumption, while probably valid when applied to the fishery as
a whole, would be a bit suspect if applied to a small segment of the fishing
grounds since crews are free to direct their effort to the areas deemed most
productive. As explained in the next section, the statistical area analyzed here
extends along, a huge stretch of coastline and is fished by boats from many home
ports. Consequently, it is infeasible for most crews to reallocate their effort
across statistical areas, at least in the short-run.
T / ' *-'-^It is worth emphasizing that stock estimates are merely that: "estimates"
based.on catch statistics, not "measurements" in any meaningful sense. If the
model used by fishery biologists to obtain these estimates were the same as the
one used here, our results would be preordained: We would simply recover the
parameter values reflected in the biologists' estimates.. In fact, the stock
estimates are based on ah "age-structured" model that recognizes, different growth
and natural and fishing mortality rates for different age cohorts. See Deriso
and Quinn (1983). . ^
l^Foreign trawler operations are the primary cause of by-catch mortality.
Incidentally caught halibut are supposed to be thrown back. Many are not. Some
.are, but subsequently die of injuries.
20
^^Various Annual, Scientific, and Technical Reports of the IPHC are the
primary data sources for this study.
^^There is another impediment to extending the sample much beyond 1972. In
1979, the IPHC modified its regulation of Area 2 by introducing separate quotas
(and, therefore, separate season lengths) for subareas 2A, 2B, and 2C.
^^Since the model is recursive, the kernel of the concentrated log-
likelihood function is simply
L = (-N/2)log det r
N
where r is the 2x2 matrix with ij element and N is the number
of observations. See Amemiya (1977). Asymptotic standard errors were estimated
using a numerical second derivative estimate of the Hessian of L. The first two
years in the sample could not be used for estimation due to the requirement of
lagged values.
^^Techniques like those developed in Bianchi et. al. (1981) could be used
to place confidence bounds on this estimate of the effects of season lengthening.
It seems likely, though, that conventionally sized confidence, intervals would
contain zero.
21
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Table 1
FIML Estimates of Equations (18) and (19)
Parameter
q
b
G
M
Al
^2
PI
Estimate
5.893E-04
0.9585
4.078E-06
188.52
.22.674
12.695
0.6233
0.9042
Number of observations = 36
Log of likelihood function « -193.874
R^V: for
Season Length
Stock
0.972
0.984
Asymptotic
Standard Error
5.803E-05'
0.0498
2.491E-06
48.00
14.324
15.389
0.1357
0.1174
22
Squared simple correlation coefficients for actual and one-step-ahead forecast
series of season length and stock.
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